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Abstract. We set up a two-stage game with sequential moves by one altruistic agent and
n selﬁsh agents. The rotten kid theorem states that the altruist can only reach her ﬁrst
best when the selﬁsh agents move before the altruist. The Samaritan’s dilemma, on the
other hand, states that the altruist can only reach her ﬁrst best when she moves before
the selﬁsh agents. We ﬁnd that in general, the altruist can reach her ﬁrst best when she
moves ﬁrst, if and only if a selﬁsh agent’s action marginally only aﬀects his own payoﬀ.
The altruist can reach her ﬁr s tb e s tw h e ns h em o v e sl a s ti fa n do n l yi ft h e r ei sj u s to n e
commodity involved. When the altruist cannot reach her ﬁrst best when she moves last,
the outcome is not Pareto eﬃcient either.
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However much we care about other people, we do not wish to invite them to take advantage
of our charity. The economic theory of altruism oﬀers two conﬂicting pieces of strategic
advice: the rotten kid theorem (Becker [1] [2]) and the Samaritan’s dilemma (Buchanan
[7]). In a single-round model with sequential moves by an altruistic agent (the Samaritan
or the parent) and a selﬁsh agent (the parasite or the kid), the contradiction between the
two can be stated as follows.
The rotten kid theorem states that the parent can only reach her ﬁr s tb e s tw h e ns h e
moves after the kid. The intuition is that the kid will only act unselﬁshly if the parent
can reward him afterward. The Samaritan’s dilemma, on the other hand, states that
the Samaritan can only reach his ﬁrst best when he moves before the parasite. Here,
the intuition is that only when the Samaritan moves ﬁrst will his actions be immune to
manipulation by the parasite.
In this paper, we shall identify the restrictions on the agents’ payoﬀ functions for either
result to hold. For the altruist to reach her ﬁrst best when she moves ﬁrst, a selﬁsh agent’s
actions should only aﬀect his own payoﬀ on the margin. Then there are no externalities to
his actions. For the altruist to reach her ﬁrst best when she moves last, there should only
be one commodity, which we might call income. Then a selﬁsh agent cannot manipulate
the altruist’s trade-oﬀ between her own and the selﬁsh agents’ payoﬀs. The selﬁsh agents
will maximize aggregate income. They beneﬁt from this themselves, because their payoﬀs
are normal goods to the altruist.
As we interpret Samaritan’s dilemma and rotten kid theorem, they have a positive as
w e l la san e g a t i v es i d e .T h ep o s i t i v es i d ei st h a tt h ea l t r u i s tc a nr e a c hh e rﬁr s tb e s tu n d e r
one sequence of moves. The negative side is that she cannot reach her ﬁrst best under
the other sequence. Many authors have used the terms Samaritan’s dilemma and rotten
kid theorem in the positive sense only. We shall refer to these versions as the positive
Samaritan’s dilemma and the positive rotten kid theorem.
Our result for the positive Samaritan’s dilemma is new. For the positive rotten kid
theorem, Bergstrom [3] has performed a similar analysis. His model can be seen as a
2special version of our more general setup. Whereas we do not restrict the nature of the
altruist’s actions, Bergstrom [3] assumes she distributes a certain amount of money among
the selﬁsh agents. Removing this restriction results in a slightly more general condition
for the positive rotten kid theorem.
The focus of this paper is on the simple one-shot game with complete information with
which the theory started 25 year ago. Since then, more complex games between altruists
and selﬁsh agents have been studied.1 It would be worthwhile to expand the general
analysis to encompass multi-period models and asymmetric or incomplete information.
However peripheral to economics the study of altruism may seem, there is in fact an
application that takes us to the very heart of the discipline (Munger [22]). Regarding
the welfare-maximizing government as an altruist and the private agents as selﬁsh agents,
we have a framework for a policy game. This framework allows us to study how the
government can shape incentives such that private actions maximize social welfare.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce and discuss
the Samaritan’s dilemma and the rotten kid theorem in simple two-agent setups where
they are known to hold. In Section 3, we set up a single-round game with n selﬁsh agents,
deriving the conditions for the Samaritan’s dilemma and the rotten kid theorem to hold.
In Section 4, we discuss Samaritan’s dilemma and rotten kid theorem in terms of Pareto
eﬃciency. In Section 5, we discuss Bergstrom’s [3] game as well as Bergstrom’s [3] own




The Samaritan’s dilemma is due to Buchanan [7] who discusses a game between an altru-
istic Samaritan and a selﬁsh parasite.2 H es h o w st h a tt h eS a m a r i t a nc a nr e a c hh i sﬁrst
1Bruce and Waldman [5] [6] and Lindbeck and Weibull [19] have analyzed two-period lifetime models.
Chami [9] [10] and Lagerlöf [18] assume asymmetric information. Coate [8], Lord and Raganzas [20] and
Wigger [26] include uncertainty.
2Buchanan [7] distinguishes between the active and the passive Samaritan’s dilemma. We shall only
discuss the passive Samaritan’s dilemma here. The passive Samaritan’s preferences are reconcilable with
ap a y o ﬀ function that only depends on his donation. The active Samaritan’s payoﬀ, on the other hand,
3best when he moves before the parasite, but not when he moves after the parasite. In
this subsection, we shall present a continuous version of the game.3
The Samaritan maximizes his objective function W(U0,U 1),i n c r e a s i n gi nh i so w n
payoﬀ U0 and the parasite’s payoﬀ U1: Wk ≡ ∂W/∂Uk > 0,k =0 ,1.T h e p a r a s i t e
maximizes his own payoﬀ U1. The Samaritan’s own payoﬀ U0 only depends on his donation
y to the parasite, so that we can simply set U0 = −y. The parasite’s payoﬀ depends on his
work eﬀort x a n do nt h eS a m a r i t a n ’ sd o n a t i o ny. The parasite’s payoﬀ function U1(y,x)
has the following properties:
• ∂U1/dy > 0, ∂2U1/∂y2 ≤ 0. The parasite’s marginal payoﬀ of money is positive and
decreasing.
• ∂U1/∂x>[<]0 for x<[>]x∗(y),x ∗(y) > 0; ∂2U1/∂x2 ≤ 0. Given the Samaritan’s
donation y, there is an optimal work eﬀort x∗(y) for the parasite, where the marginal
payoﬀ of extra money earned equals the marginal payoﬀ of leisure.
• ∂2U1/∂y∂x<0. An increase in the parasite’s eﬀort decreases his marginal payoﬀ of
money. This is because the parasite earns more money when he works harder and
his marginal payoﬀ of money is decreasing.









We shall now see that the Samaritan can always reach his ﬁrst best when he moves
ﬁrst, but he can never reach his ﬁr s tb e s tw h e nh em o v e sl a s t .
must also depend on the parasite’s action. This follows from the fact that, given that the Samaritan
donates, the active Samaritan prefers the parasite to go to work although the parasite prefers to stay in
bed. Schmidtchen [24] provides an analysis of the active Samaritan’s dilemma.
3Jürges [16] also analyzes this game. Bergstrom ([3], 1140-1) analyzes a similar game, where a parent
distributes money after his “lazy rotten kids” have set their work eﬀorts. Neither Bergstrom [3] nor
Jürges [16] identify the game with the Samaritan’s dilemma.





This condition is identical to the ﬁrst order condition (2) for the Samaritan’s ﬁrst best
with respect to x. Thus, in stage one, the Samaritan can set y a c c o r d i n gt oh i sﬁrst best
condition (1). This means that the Samaritan can always reach his ﬁr s tb e s tw h e nh e
moves ﬁrst.
The intuition is that the parasite sets the work eﬀort that maximizes his own payoﬀ,
taking the Samaritan’s donation as given. Since the parasite’s work eﬀort only aﬀects
his own payoﬀ, the parasite takes the full eﬀect of his decision into account. There is no
externality, and the Samaritan’s ﬁr s tb e s ti si m p l e m e n t e d .
W h e nt h ep a r a s i t em o v e sﬁrst, the Samaritan sets y a c c o r d i n gt o( 1 )i ns t a g et w o .I n
stage one, the parasite sets the x that maximizes his own payoﬀ,t a k i n gi n t oa c c o u n tt h a t












This only corresponds to the Samaritan’s ﬁrst order condition (2) for x when dy/dx =
0, i.e. the donation reaches its maximum, in the optimum. In order to ﬁnd the expression
for dy/dx in the optimum, we totally diﬀerentiate the Samaritan’s ﬁrst order condition



















The numerator in (3) is negative, because W1 > 0 and ∂2U1/∂y∂x<0. The denomi-
nator is positive, because this is the second order condition ∂2W/∂y2 < 0.
Thus, the parasite gets more money from the Samaritan, the less he works. As a
result, the parasite will work less than the Samaritan would like him to. The Samaritan
cannot reach his ﬁrst best when he moves after the parasite. Intuitively, the less money
t h ep a r a s i t ee a r n s ,t h en e e d i e rh ei sa n dt h em o r em o n e yh ew i l lg e tf r o mt h eS a m a r i t a n .
5When the parasite moves ﬁrst, he can extort more money from the Samaritan by working
less. We can also say that the parasite gets the Samaritan to buy more of his payoﬀ U1
by lowering its price.
2.2 Rotten kid theorem
In order to introduce the rotten kid theorem, we analyze the simple game discussed by
Becker [1] [2] and commented upon by Hirshleifer [15]. The game is between an altruistic
parent and a selﬁsh kid. The kid can undertake an action that aﬀects his own as well as
the parent’s income. The parent can give money to the kid. We shall see that in general,
the parent cannot reach her ﬁrst best when she moves ﬁrst, but she can always reach her
ﬁr s tb e s tw h e ns h em o v e sa f t e rt h ek i d .
In fact, Becker [1] [2] himself does not discuss the order of moves. Citing Shake-
speare’s King Lear, Hirshleifer [15] was the ﬁr s tt op o i n to u tt h a tt h ep a r e n t ’ sﬁrst best
is implemented only when the kid moves ﬁrst.4
Denote the kid’s action by x and the parent’s transfer by y. Since the only commodity
involved is income, we can equate the parent’s and kid’s payoﬀs, U0 and U1 respectively,
with income and write them in the additively separable form:
U0 = −y + b0(x) U1 = y + b1(x) (4)
Here, bk(x),k=0 ,1, is the eﬀe c to ft h ek i d ’ sa c t i o no nt h ei n c o m eo ft h ep a r e n ta n d
the kid, respectively.
The selﬁsh kid maximizes his own payoﬀ U1. The parent maximizes her objective
function W(U0,U 1) with Wk ≡ ∂W/∂Uk > 0,k=0 ,1.
The ﬁrst order conditions for the parent’s ﬁrst best are, with respect to y and x
4Pollak [23] oﬀers an alternative qualiﬁcation: The parent can reach her ﬁr s tb e s to n l yi fs h em a k e s
a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the kid. The oﬀer speciﬁes the kid’s action and the parent’s transfer. Cox
[12] elaborates on this point. He argues that the parent can only reach her ﬁrst best if the kid is better
oﬀ accepting the oﬀer to implement the ﬁrst best than rejecting it. Cox [12] calls this “altruism”. If
the kid’s participation constraint is binding, the parent will oﬀer a diﬀerent contract which gives the
kid his reservation payoﬀ. Cox calls this “exchange”. In our model, we assume that the selﬁsh agent’s
participation constraint never binds.
6respectively:












This implies that in the parent’s ﬁrst best, family income U0+U1 = b0+b1 is maximized.
When the parent moves before the kid, the kid will set b0
1 =0 . In general, this does
not correspond to the parent’s ﬁrst order condition (7). When the kid moves last, he will
maximize his own income instead of family income.
Now we shall see what happens when the kid moves before the parent. In stage two,
the parent will set the transfer y that maximizes W, according to (5). In stage one, the










The value of dy/dx follows from the total diﬀerentiation of the parent’s ﬁrst order



















By the kid’s ﬁrst order condition (8), the second term between brackets on the RHS






Substituting this into the kid’s ﬁrst order condition (8), we see that it is equivalent to
the parent’s ﬁrst best condition (7): the kid eﬀectively maximizes family income.
Thus, the parent always reaches her ﬁrst best when she moves after the kid. As Bern-
heim et al. [4] and Bergstrom [3] already noted, this result follows from the assumption
that there is only one commodity, namely income. The intuition, due to Bergstrom [3],
7is that when there is only one commodity, say income, we can identify payoﬀ with in-
come. The kid cannot manipulate the price of his income in terms of the parent’s income,
because it is always unity. Then the parent and the kid agree that it is a good thing
to maximize aggregate income. It is clear that the parent will want to maximize family
income. However, as Becker [1] already notes, the kid will only want to maximize family
income if he beneﬁts from that himself, i.e. if his payoﬀ is a normal good to the parent.5
3A g e n e r a l a n a l y s i s
3.1 The model
In this section, we analyze a model with one altruistic agent and n selﬁsh agents. We shall
see under which conditions the Samaritan’s dilemma and the rotten kid theorem hold.
There are n +1agents, indexed by k =0 ,···,n. Agent 0 is the altruist and agents
i, i =1 ,···,n, are the selﬁsh agents. Agent i controls the variable xi.A g e n t 0 c a n
contribute to each agent i’s payoﬀ Ui. This contribution is denoted by yi. Therefore,
∂Ui/∂yi > 0 for i =1 ,···,n,and ∂Ui/∂yj =0for all j =1 ,···,n, j6= i, by deﬁnition.
There will be an upper and a lower bound to y =( y1,···,y n). The lower bound is
y =0 : agent 0 can only give to the other agents, she cannot improve her own payoﬀ at
the expense of the others. The upper bound follows from the restriction that agent 0 only
has a limited amount of time, money, or whatever the nature of y, to give to the others.
The exact formulation of the upper bound depends on the nature of y.W es h a l la s s u m e
that neither the upper nor the lower bound are binding constraints on the equilibria.
Agent 0’s payoﬀ has the form U0(y,x), which is continuous and twice diﬀerentiable,
with x =( x1,···,x n).A g e n t i’s payoﬀ has the form Ui(yi,x), which is continuous and
twice diﬀerentiable with ∂2Ui/∂x2
i ≤ 0.E a c h a g e n t i,i =1 ,···,n, maximizes his own
payoﬀ.A g e n t 0, however, does not only care about her own payoﬀ, but also about the
payoﬀso fa l lo t h e rn agents. Her objective function is W(U), continuous and twice
diﬀerentiable with U ≡ (U0,···,U n), Wk ≡ ∂W/∂Uk > 0,k=0 ,···,n.
Let us now determine the ﬁrst-best outcome for agent 0. We assume that the ﬁrst
best is characterized by an interior solution. Thus, W should be concave in (y,x).D i f -
5A formal proof of this point in the general setup of Section 3 is available from the author.









Note that since W0,W i > 0 and ∂Ui/∂yi > 0,w em u s th a v e∂U0/∂yi < 0 in the








Whatever agent 0’s precise preferences, her ﬁrst best will always be on the payoﬀ






x,y Ui s.t. U−i = U
∗
−i,i =1 ,···,n (12)
where U−i ≡ (U0,···,U i−1,U i+1,···,U n).L e tx∗ be an x vector that is associated with
a U∗,a n dX∗ the set of all x∗:
x
∗(U
∗)=a r g m a x







I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,w es h a l ls t u d yt h ee ﬀect of sequential moves. The agents i, i =
1,···,n,will always move simultaneously. In subsection 3.2, we see what happens when
agent 0 moves before agents i. In subsection 3.3, we analyze the case where the agents i
move before agent 0. We will derive the conditions for these sequences of moves to result
in agent 0’s ﬁrst best for all W(U). The conditions will thus be on the payoﬀ functions
U. We are looking for the necessary and suﬃcient local restrictions on U under which
the ﬁrst order conditions of the subgame perfect equilibrium are equal to the ﬁrst order
conditions (10) and (11) of agent 0’s ﬁrst best. We shall assume that the second order
conditions, which involve a combination of restrictions on W(U) and U,a r es a t i s ﬁed.
In our interpretation of the Samaritan’s dilemma and the rotten kid theorem, they do
not only have a positive side to them (agent 0 can reach her ﬁr s tb e s tu n d e ro n es e q u e n c e
of moves), but also a negative side: Agent 0 cannot reach her ﬁr s tb e s tu n d e rt h eo t h e r
sequence. In subsection 3.4, we give the formal deﬁnitions and state the conditions for
the Samaritan’s dilemma to apply and for the rotten kid theorem to hold.
93.2 Agent 0 moves ﬁrst
In this subsection, we derive the equilibrium for the game where agent 0 moves before
agents i, and we see when this equilibrium corresponds to the ﬁrst best for agent 0. Thus,
we shall derive the condition for the positive Samaritan’s dilemma to hold:
Deﬁnition 1 The positive Samaritan’s dilemma states that agent 0 can reach her ﬁrst
best when she moves in stage one and agents i, i =1 ,···,n,move in stage two.
We assume an interior solution. The game is solved by backwards induction. In stage
two, each agent i, i =1 ,···,n,sets the xi that maximizes his own payoﬀ,t a k i n gyi and




In stage one, agent 0 sets the yi that maximize her objective function W(U),t a k i n g
















Substituting (14) and diﬀerentiating the ith condition (14) totally with respect to yi,


















In general, the outcome will not be agent 0’s ﬁrst best. We shall now see under which
condition agent 0 can reach her ﬁrst best when she moves ﬁrst.6
Condition 1 For all x ∈ X




Proposition 1 Given that all agents’ second order conditions are satisﬁed, the positive
Samaritan’s dilemma holds for all W(U) if and only if Condition 1 holds.
6All proofs are in the Appendix.
10The intuition behind the result is straightforward. When selﬁsh agent i moves last, he
does not take into account the eﬀect of his action on any of the other agents’ payoﬀs. In
general, this can only result in the ﬁrst best for agent 0 if agent i’s action does not aﬀect
any other agent’s payoﬀ,7 at least not on the margin. Then agent i takes the full eﬀect of
his actions into account. There is no externality, and agent 0’s ﬁrst best is implemented.
3.3 Agents i move ﬁrst
In this subsection, we derive the equilibrium for the game where agents i move before
agent 0, and we see when this equilibrium corresponds to the ﬁrst best for agent 0. Thus,
we shall derive the conditions for the positive rotten kid theorem to hold:
Deﬁnition 2 The positive rotten kid theorem states that agent 0 can reach her ﬁrst best
when agents i, i =1 ,···,n,move in stage one and agent 0 moves in stage two.
We solve the game by backwards induction, assuming an interior solution. In stage two,









Of course these conditions are identical to the ﬁrst order conditions (10) for agent 0’s
ﬁrst best with respect to yj.
In stage one, each agent i, i =1 ,···,n, sets the xi that maximizes his own payoﬀ,
taking the xl, l =1 ,···,i− 1,i+1 ,···,n,from the other n − 1 agents moving in stage












T h ev a l u e sf o rdyj/dxi, j =1 ,···,n, follow from the total diﬀerentiation of the n
conditions (16) with respect to xi. We shall write the total diﬀerential of (16) with























7This is the condition we already encountered in subsection 2.1.
11In general, the equilibrium conditions (17) and (18) for xi,i=1 ,···,n,are not iden-
tical to the corresponding ﬁrst order conditions (11) for agent 0’s ﬁrst best. We shall now
see when they are. Let us ﬁrst state an intermediate result.
Condition 2 Consider a marginal change in xi after which y is adjusted optimally ac-

























for all i,j =1 ,···,n.T h e n dUl/dxi =0when dUi/dxi =0for all x ∈ X
∗ and for all
l =0 ,···,n,i=1 ,···,n, l 6= i.
Lemma 1 Given that the second order conditions are satisﬁed, the positive rotten kid
theorem holds for all W(U) if and only if Condition 2 holds.
Note the analogy with Proposition 1 from subsection 3.2. When agents i move last,
they set ∂Ui/∂xi =0 . This will result in agent 0’s ﬁr s tb e s tf o ra l lW(U) if and only if
∂Ul/∂xi =0for all l 6= i. When agents i move ﬁrst, they set dUi/dxi =0 . This will result
in agent 0’s ﬁr s tb e s tf o ra l lW(U) if and only if dUl/dxi =0for all l 6= i.
Condition 2 is not a condition on the payoﬀ functions yet. It requires agent 0 to set
all dUl/dxi =0and thus depends on agent 0’s behaviour.
Condition 3 X∗ consists of a single vector ˜ x.
Proposition 2 Given that the second order conditions are satisﬁed, the positive rotten
kid theorem holds for all W(U) if and only if Condition 3 holds.
We can say that the price of an agent i’s payoﬀ along the PPF should be constant
and beyond manipulation by agent i. Then we can aggregate all payoﬀs using these
prices and refer to aggregate payoﬀ as income I(x),a sd e ﬁn e di n( ??). The agents i will
maximize income and agent 0 will redistribute income. In the terminology of Monderer
and Shapley [21], Condition 3 turns the game into a potential game, where all agents









Figure 1: Intersecting Utility Possibility Curves
F i g u r e1i l l u s t r a t e sw h a tg o e sw r o n gw h e nas e l ﬁsh agent can inﬂuence the price of his
payoﬀ or equivalently, when the PPF consists of multiple UPCs. Point A is agent 0’s ﬁrst
best. It is reached when the single selﬁsh agent 1 selects the action xA that implements
UPCA.L e tUPCA b et h ea n c h o ra c c o r d i n gt oD e ﬁnition ??,s ot h a ti ti sas t r a i g h tl i n e .
Now suppose agent 1 can decrease the price of his own payoﬀ, either by increasing or
decreasing his x. For instance, when agent 1 chooses xB, the resulting UPCB is ﬂatter
than UPCA, lies everywhere below agent 0’s ﬁrst-best indiﬀerence curve IA and intersects
UPCA so that the PPF does not consist of UPCA alone. At the point where UPCB
comes closest to IA, U1 is higher and U0 is lower than in A,b e c a u s eUPCB is ﬂatter than
UPCA.T h e n U1 will also be higher in point B, where agent 0’s indiﬀerence curve IB
is tangent to UPCB. Agent 1 will prefer implementing UPCB to UPCA,b e c a u s eU1 is
higher in point B on UPCB than in point A on UPCA.
133.4 Conditions for Samaritan’s dilemma and rotten kid theorem
There are two alternative deﬁnitions for the Samaritan’s dilemma and the rotten kid
theorem, applied to agent 0’s ﬁrst best. The positive deﬁnition of the Samaritan’s dilemma
(the rotten kid theorem) is: agent 0 can reach her ﬁr s tb e s tw h e ns h em o v e sﬁrst (last).
In subsections 3.2 and 3.3, we have already deﬁned the positive versions of Samaritan’s
dilemma and rotten kid theorem and derived the conditions for them to hold.
The second deﬁnition of the Samaritan’s dilemma (the rotten kid theorem) also in-
cludes a negative side: agent 0 can reach her ﬁrst best when she moves ﬁrst (last), but
not when she moves last (ﬁrst). This is the deﬁnition we adhere to in this paper. We
shall now formally deﬁne the Samaritan’s dilemma and the rotten kid theorem:
Deﬁnition 3 The Samaritan’s dilemma states that agent 0 can reach her ﬁr s tb e s tw h e n
she moves in stage one and agents i, i =1 ,···,n,move in stage two, but not when agents
i move in stage one and agent 0 moves in stage two.
Deﬁnition 4 The rotten kid theorem states that agent 0 can reach her ﬁr s tb e s tw h e n
agents i move in stage one and agent 0 moves in stage two, but not when agent 0 moves
in stage one and agents i, i =1 ,···,n,move in stage two.
For the Samaritan’s dilemma, we can simply take our Conditions 1 and 3:
Proposition 3 Given that all agents’ second order conditions are satisﬁed, the Samari-
tan’s dilemma holds for all W(U) if and only if Condition 1 holds and Condition 3 does
not hold.
For the rotten kid theorem, the analysis is somewhat more complicated. Agent 0
can reach her ﬁrst best when she moves ﬁrst for any Wk > 0 if all ∂Ul/∂xj =0 ,j=
1,···,n, l=0 ,···,n, l6= j (Condition 1). But under Condition 3, which ensures that
agent 0 can reach her ﬁst best when she moves last, substituting (??)i n t o( 1 0 )r e v e a l s
that all Wk are equal in the ﬁrst best. Then agent 0 can reach her ﬁrst best when she
moves ﬁrst if all
P
l ∂Ul/∂xj =0 .W ed o n ’ tn e e d∂Ul/∂xj =0for all l,a sl o n ga st h es u m
is zero.8
8Obviously, Conditions 1 and 4 only diﬀer for n>1.







for x = x∗ and all i =1 ,···,n.
Proposition 4 Given that all agents’ second order conditions are satisﬁed, the rotten kid
theorem holds for all W(U) if and only if Condition 3 holds and Condition 4 does not
hold.
4P a r e t o e ﬃciency
Whereas we have stated the Samaritan’s dilemma and the rotten kid theorem in terms
of agent 0’s ﬁr s tb e s t ,a na l t e r n a t i v ea n do f t e nu s e df o r m u l a t i o ni si nt e r m so fP a r e t o
eﬃciency.9 In this section we shall examine the links between the two formulations.
It is clear that agent 0’s ﬁr s tb e s ti saP a r e t oo p t i m u m ,s i n c ea n yo t h e ra l l o c a t i o n
would make her worse oﬀ. The interesting question is: When agent 0 cannot reach her
ﬁrst best when she moves last (ﬁr s t ) ,d o e st h i si m p l yt h a tt h eo u t c o m ei sn o tP a r e t o
eﬃcient either?
Let us ﬁrst establish the relation between agent 0’s ﬁrst best and Pareto eﬃciency
in general. With equation (12) in subsection 3.1, we have already deﬁned the payoﬀ
possibility frontier PPF.T h i sd e ﬁnition implies:
Lemma 2 For each allocation U∗ on the Payoﬀ Possibility Frontier (PPF), dU∗
k/dxi =0
is feasible for all k =0 ,···,n, and all i =1 ,···,n, where dU0/dxi and dUj/dxi,j=
1,···,n,are deﬁned by (19) and (20) respectively.
The idea behind this lemma is the following. Consider a marginal change in xi,a f t e r
which agent 0 adjusts y to compensate all agents j: dUj/dxi =0for all j =1 ,···,n.A f t e r
this compensation, U0 should also be back at its original level: dU0/dxi =0 . Otherwise,
U0 can be increased while all Uj,j=1 ,···,n, remain the same.
9Bergstrom ([3], p. 1146) identiﬁes the altruist’s ﬁrst best with “the” Pareto optimum, neglecting the
fact that there is a whole range of Pareto optima.
15If agent 0 were selﬁsh, then all allocations on the PPF would be Pareto eﬃcient.
However, when agent 0 is an altruist, a Pareto improvement from some allocations on the
PPF may be possible. This would be the case if an increase in yi, which obviously raises
Ui, would also increase the value of agent 0’s objective function W.L e tu sn o wd e ﬁne the
Altruistic Payoﬀ Possibility Frontier APPF as that part of the PPF from which Pareto
improvements are impossible:
Deﬁnition 5 UA∗ is an element of agent 0’s Altruistic Payoﬀ Possibility Frontier (APPF)
if and only if it is an element of the PPF and dW(UA∗)/dyi ≤ 0 for all i =1 ,···,n.
Lemma 3 All allocations and only the allocations UA∗ are Pareto eﬃcient.
In our continuous version of the Samaritan’s dilemma in subsection 2.1, the sequence
where the parasite moves ﬁrst does not lead to a Pareto optimum. The parasite does not
work hard enough, because a higher work eﬀort would decrease the Samaritan’s donation.
Given the Samaritan’s donation, however, the parasite could increase his own payoﬀ and
the Samaritan’s objective function by working harder. We will now see that this result
holds in general. Intuitively, the reason why a Pareto-eﬃcient allocation is not agent 0’s
ﬁrst best is that agent 0 does not like the payoﬀ distribution. However, when agent 0
moves last, she determines the payoﬀ distribution. Then, when the allocation is Pareto-
eﬃcient, it must be agent 0’s ﬁrst best.
Proposition 5 In the game where agents i,i =1 ,···,n, move in stage one and agent 0
moves in stage two, the outcome is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if it is agent 0’s ﬁrst best.
In our continuous version of the rotten kid theorem (subsection 2.2), when the parent
cannot reach her ﬁr s tb e s tw h e ns h em o v e sﬁrst, the outcome is not Pareto eﬃcient either.
Pareto eﬃciency requires the kid to maximize family income, but the kid will maximize
his own income instead. We shall now see that this result can only be generalized partially.
Proposition 6 C o n s i d e rt h eg a m ew h e r ea g e n t0m o v e si ns t a g eo n ea n da g e n t si,i =
1,···,n,move in stage two. The outcome is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if it is agent 0’s
ﬁrst best when:
161. n =1 , and/or:
2. agent 0 can reach her ﬁrst best for all W(U) when agents i,i =1 ,···,n,m o v ei n
stage one and agent 0 moves in stage two.
Otherwise, the resulting allocation U is a Pareto optimum if and only if it is on agent
0’s APPF according to Deﬁnition 5.
5 Bergstrom’s rotten kid game
5.1 Introduction
The present paper is not the ﬁrst to have derived conditions for the rotten kid theorem to
hold. Bergstrom [3] and Cornes and Silva [11] have previously derived a condition from
am o r es p e c i ﬁc model than ours. In this model, the altruist distributes a certain sum of
money among the selﬁsh agents. The total amount of money available may depend on
the selﬁsh agents’ actions. In this setup, it would be somewhat contrived to study the
sequence where the altruist moves ﬁrst. Accordingly, Bergstrom [3] (at least in his formal
model) and Cornes and Silva [11] limit their attention to the positive rotten kid theorem
as deﬁn e di no u rD e ﬁnition 2.
In subsection 5.2, we shall present Bergstrom’s [3] solution for the positive rotten kid
theorem. We shall see that as his maximization problem for the altruist is a special case
of our more general problem, his payoﬀ condition is an accordingly special version of our
payoﬀ condition. In subsection 5.3, we shall discuss Cornes and Silva’s [11] condition for
the positive rotten kid theorem to hold in Bergstrom’s [3] model. We shall see that this
condition does not carry over to our own more general model and that there are no further
solutions to our or Bergstrom’s [3] model.
5.2 Bergstrom’s solution
In this subsection, we shall discuss Bergstrom’s [3] conditions for the positive rotten kid
theorem. His condition on the payoﬀ f u n c t i o n si ss l i g h t l yd i ﬀerent from our Condition 3.
The diﬀerence can be traced to diﬀerences in the altruist’s maximization problem. We
shall also discuss the diﬀerences in the additional conditions and their derivation.
17In Bergstrom’s [3] model,.the role of the altruist is limited to the distribution of a
certain amount of money. We shall move from our model to Bergstrom’s [3] in two steps.
First, let us derive the condition for the positive rotten kid theorem in case agent 0’s
objective function includes U0, but y is restricted to “money”. The relevant property of
money in this context is the following:
Deﬁnition 6 When y is money, agent 0’s payoﬀ d e p e n d so nh o wm u c hs h ed o e so n
aggregate for all other agents, but not on the distribution of this total amount among the
agents. Then the altruist’s payoﬀ U0(y,x) is given by U0(y0,x) with y0 ≡−
Pn
i=1 yi.
Applying Deﬁnition 6 of money to our payoﬀ condition (??), we ﬁnd ∂U0/∂y0 =
∂Ui/∂yi,w h i c hr e s u l t si np a y o ﬀ functions of the form:
Uk = A(x)yk + Bk(x) (21)
The second and ﬁnal step from our framework to Bergstrom’s [3] is to exclude U0
from agent 0’s objective function and to introduce a budget constraint for y0.A g e n t0 ’ s
maximization problem is now:
max W(U1(y1,x),···,U n(yn,x)) s.t.
n X
i=1
yi = y(x) (22)
This restriction does not result in a further restriction on the payoﬀ functions. Thus,
the positive rotten kid theorem holds for all W(U) and all y(x) if and only if Uk has the
form (21) for k =1 ,···,n. This is exactly the condition that Bergstrom [3] derives for
the positive rotten kid theorem.
It should be noted that the diﬀerence between Bergstrom’s condition (21) and our
Condition 3 is irrelevant when agent 0 moves last. This is the sequence that we are
primarily interested in. In fact, as we have argued above, this is the only sequence one
can meaningfully study in Bergstrom’s maximization problem (22).
The intuition behind the equivalence of conditions (21) and 3 when agent 0 moves last
is the following. The positive rotten kid theorem holds if there is only one good, which
we might call money. Bergstrom [3] assumes from the outset that y is money, whereas
we have not restricted the nature of y. However, when the positive rotten kid theorem











Figure 2: The importance of money
Let us now look at the additional conditions for the positive rotten kid theorem.
Bergstrom’s [3] Proposition 3 states that when the positive rotten kid theorem holds,
all Ui are normal goods and money is important enough, then payoﬀ functions have the
form (21). The assumption of normal goods is necessary for the second order conditions
to hold in our framework as well, but we have not encountered anything resembling
the condition that money is important enough. The rationale behind this condition is
illustrated in Figure 2. Consider parallel UPCsw i t hUPCA the outermost curve. The
highest attainable value of U0 on UPCA is UA
0 .O nUPCB however, U0 can rise above UA
0 .
Money is not important enough to raise U0 above UA
0 on UPCA.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ePPF
consists of more than one UPC, although the UPCs are parallel. This creates a problem
for the altruist with indiﬀerence curve IB whose ﬁrst best is point B on UPCB.A g e n t
1 will not implement UPCB, because when he sets UPCA, agent 0 will choose point A
with higher U1 than point B.W eh a v ei m p l i c i t l ye x c l u d e dt h i sp r o b l e mb ya s s u m i n gt h a t
equilibria are always characterized by internal solutions. In Figure 2, the equilibrium A
19of the game is a corner solution, because the altruist’s indiﬀerence curve is not tangent
to UPCA.
Finally, there is a diﬀerence in approach. Bergstrom [3] mentions the trade-oﬀ between
restricting W and restricting U, suggesting that the normal good assumption is a very
mild restriction on W. Unlike Bergstrom, we formally derive the payoﬀ condition from
the requirement that the ﬁrst order conditions for the game and the altruist’s ﬁrst best
should coincide.10
5.3 Cornes and Silva’s solution
In subsection 5.2, we have seen that Bergstrom’s [3] own condition (21) for the positive
rotten kid theorem in his game is a special case of our Condition 3. Cornes and Silva [11]
recently found another and completely diﬀerent condition for the positive rotten kid the-
orem to hold in Bergstrom’s [3] framework. Under this condition, all kids contribute to a
pure public good. The reason why Cornes and Silva [11] could ﬁnd an additional condition
is that they, unlike Bergstrom [3], have put a restriction on the budget constraint.
In this subsection we discuss Cornes and Silva’s [11] result in the light of our own
analysis, demonstrating why it does not carry over to our more general framework. We
shall also argue that there are no additional conditions under which the rotten kid theorem
holds for all W(U), neither in Bergstrom’s [3] framework, nor in our more general setup.
In the notation of this paper, Cornes and Silva’s [11] model can be described as follows.
Agent i, i =1 ,···,n,only aﬀects the others through his contribution xi to a pure public
good X ≡
Pn
i=1 xi.A g e n ti has to decide how much xi of his initial exogenous endowment
mi to contribute to the pure public good. The rest of the endowment plus the transfer ti
from agent 0 is available for consumption yi of the private good. Agent 0’s budget is zero:
Pn
i=1 ti =0 , so that she will also take away from some agents: ti < 0 is feasible. Agent
0’s budget constraint can also be written as
Pn
i=1 yi = M − X,w i t hM ≡
Pn
i=1 mi.
The diﬀerence between Bergstrom’s [3] and Cornes and Silva’s [11] condition is that
Bergstrom’s [3] condition works for all W(U) and all y(x), whereas Cornes and Silva’s
10Bergstrom [3] restricts the proof of his Proposition 3 to the case of two kids “where the geometry
allows an easy, intuitive proof. Extension to higher dimensions is not diﬃcult, but the exposition is
tedious.” ( [3], p. 1153) We hope our formal exposition is less tedious than the one that Bergstrom [3]
had in mind.
20[11] condition works for all W(U), but with a restriction y(x)=y(
Pn
i=1 xi) on the budget
constraint. Intuitively, for the rotten kid theorem to hold, agent 0 must react in the same
way to any change in x, setting dUk/dxi =0for all k =[ 0 ,1],···,nand all i =1 ,···,n.
The Cornes and Silva [11] solution achieves this standardization by deﬁning xi as agent
i’s contribution to the pure public good X. In our solution, the standardization follows
from the fact that all agents i contribute to aggregate income I as deﬁned by (??).11
Cornes and Silva [11] only show that the pure public good case is suﬃcient for the
positive rotten kid theorem to hold in Bergstrom’s [3] framework. They do not address
the issue whether there might still be more solutions. We shall now see that there are no
additional solutions to Bergstrom’s [3] problem.
First, let us brieﬂy present the derivation of Bergstr o m ’ s[ 3 ]o w ns o l u t i o nw i t ho u r
method from subsection 3.3. Analogous to Lemma 1, dUj/dxi =0must hold for all
i,j =1 ,···,n for the rotten kid theorem to apply for all W(U).T h e a g e n t s i set
dUi/dxi =0themselves. We need conditions on U to make sure that agent 0 will set
dUl/dxi =0for all other l,i =1 ,···,n,l6= i. These conditions are (21).
How can we possibly ﬁnd an additional payoﬀ condition for all W(U)? Obviously,
this condition should also yield dUl/dxi =0for all l,i =1 ,···,n, l 6= i. In deriving
condition (21), we have assumed that agent 0 would have to set all dUl/dxi =0herself.
Alternatively, we could impose some restrictions R on the payoﬀ functions Ui(yi,x) so
that dUi/dxi =0automatically implies dUl/dxi =0f o rs o m e( b u tn o ta l l )l,i =1 ,···,n,
l 6= i. However, it can be shown that as long as agent 0 still has to set some dUl/dxi =0
herself, the payoﬀ condition will simply be (21) with restrictions R.
T h eo n l yo p t i o nl e f ti st h e nt oi m p o s et h a tw h e na g e n ti sets dUi/dxi =0 , this should
automatically imply dUi/dxl =0for all l,i =1 ,···,n,l6= i.T h i sw i l lb et h ec a s ei fa n d
only if we can deﬁne X ≡
Pn
i=1 xi. Then the payoﬀ functions become Ui(yi,x)=Ui(yi,X)
and the resource constraint turns into y(x)=y(X).T h en2 conditions dUi/dxj =0 ,i ,j=
1,···,n, for implementation of agent 0’s ﬁrst best reduce to n conditions dUi/dX =0 .
Agents i’s ﬁrst order conditions are also dUi/dX =0 .
Without loss of generality, we can specify y(X)=M − X.T h e nw eh a v er e p r o d u c e d
11One could also argue that aggregate income is a public good: All agents k, k =0 ,···,n,beneﬁtf r o m
an increase in aggregate income, since all agents i’s, i =1 ,···,n,payoﬀs are normal goods to agent 0.
21Cornes and Silva’s [11] pure public good case.
Following the above reasoning, it is clear why Cornes and Silva’s [11] condition does
not carry over to our more general framework. In the pure public good case where
X ≡
Pn
i=1 xi,t h ea g e n t si, i =1 ,···,n, will set dUi/dX =0 . However, this is not
suﬃcient. We still have to make sure that agent 0 will set dU0/dX =0 . She will do this if
and only if the payoﬀ functions satisfy Condition 3 with x replaced by X ≡
Pn
i=1 xi.T h u s ,
it is impossible to ﬁnd any solution other than Condition 3 in the general framework.
We conclude that an additional solution for the positive rotten kid theorem can only
exist when agent 0 does not have to set any dUk/dxi =0herself. In our general framework
this is not feasible, but in Bergstrom’s [3] more restricted setup, it is. The additional
solution in Bergstrom’s [3] setup is exactly Cornes and Silva’s [11] pure public good case.
6C o n c l u s i o n
For twenty-ﬁve years, the Samaritan’s dilemma (Buchanan [7]) and the rotten kid theorem
(Becker [1] [2]), with their mutually exclusive claims, have coexisted in the economic
theory of altruism. This paper has been the ﬁrst to analyze the conditions on the payoﬀ
functions under which either result holds for any altruistic objective function. We have
seen that the altruist can reach her ﬁrst best when she moves ﬁrst if and only if a selﬁsh
agent’s action does not aﬀect any other agent’s payoﬀ in the optimum. Then there are no
externalities to the selﬁsh agents’ actions. The altruist can reach her ﬁrst best when she
m o v e sl a s ti fa n do n l yi ft h e r ei sj u s to n ec o m m o d i t yi n v o l v e d . T h e nt h es e l ﬁsh agents
cannot manipulate the altruist’s trade-oﬀ between her own and the selﬁsh agents’ payoﬀs.
The selﬁsh agents will maximize the aggregate amount of the single commodity and the
altruist will redistribute the commodity.
The theory of altruism can also be applied to government policy. The link between
these two ﬁelds of research is that the government can be regarded as an altruist, when
it maximizes social welfare or any other objective function that depends positively on
the payoﬀ of some other player. Thus, the theory of altruism can contribute to our
understanding of when collective and individual interests coincide (Shapiro and Petchey
[25], Munger [22]). Under the conditions of the Samaritan’s dilemma, the government can
22reach the optimum if and only if it can commit to a certain policy. If the Samaritan’s
dilemma does not apply, commitment does not result in the ﬁrst best. The government
may then be better oﬀ with a time-consistent policy. Under the conditions of the rotten kid
theorem, the time-consistent policy even results in the ﬁrst best. Starting with Kydland
and Prescott [17], most analyses of time consistency have used a more complicated setup
than ours.12 However, a general framework for the study of time consistency issues is still
lacking. Our simple model of altruism would be a useful starting point for the development
of such a framework (Dijkstra [14]).
7 Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .Since agent 0 moves last, the ﬁrst order conditions (10) for agent 0’s
ﬁrst best with respect to y are satisﬁed. Substituting (10) into the ﬁrst best conditions







for all i =1 ,···,n,where dUk/dxi,k=0 ,···,n,is deﬁned by (19) and (20).
In the equilibrium of the game, agent i, i =1 ,···,n,sets dUi/dxi =0 . This will result
in the ﬁrst best condition (23) for all Wk > 0,k=0 ,···,n, if and only if dUi/dxi =0
implies dUl/dxi =0for all i =1 ,···,n, l =0 ,···,n,l 6= i in agent 0’s ﬁrst best,
characterized by x ∈ X
∗.T h i si sC o n d i t i o n2 .
Proof of Proposition 1. C o m b i n i n gC o n d i t i o n1w i t ha g e n t si’s ﬁrst order conditions
for the maximization of Ui (14), we obtain the ﬁrst best conditions for x (11). Substituting
Condition 1 into agent 0’s ﬁrst order conditions for the maximization of W (15), we obtain
the ﬁrst best conditions for y (10). This proves the “if” part. The “only if” part follows
from the requirement that (14) and (15) should turn into (11) and (10) for all values of
Wk > 0. This is only possible when Condition 1 holds.
Proof of Proposition 2. By Lemma 1, dUk/dxi =0 ,k=0 ,···,n,i=1 ,···,n,must
hold in agent 0’s ﬁrst best. Substituting this into the derivative of agent 0’s reaction
12Dijkstra [13] oﬀers a straightforward application of the Samaritan’s dilemma to time consistency.

























Agent 0 can reach her ﬁrst best for all W(U) when she moves after agents i if and
only if (24) holds for all i,j =1 ,···,nin agent 0’s ﬁrst best. For a given x ∈ X∗,d e ﬁne
the Utility Possibility Contour as the set of all feasible U. The slope of the UPC in






Condition (24) implies that a marginal change in xi,w h i c hl e a d st oad i ﬀerent UPC,




Since all UPCso nt h ePPF are parallel, UPCso nt h ePPF do not intersect, and
there can only be one UPC implementing the whole PPF.
Proof of Proposition 5. T h e“ i f ”p a r ti so b v i o u s .W i t hr e s p e c tt ot h e“ o n l yi f ”p a r t ,











































24These are (11), the ﬁrst order conditions for W with respect to x.T h u s ,a l lﬁrst best
conditions are satisﬁed and the allocation is agent 0’s ﬁrst best.
Proof of Proposition 6. In Case 1, by Lemmas 2 and 3, U can only be Pareto eﬃcient
















The second equality follows from the fact that agent 1 sets ∂U1/∂x =0in stage two.














Thus, dU0/dx = dU1/dx =0is feasible if and only if ∂U0/∂x =0 . But then Condition
1i ss a t i s ﬁed and U is agent 0’s ﬁrst best.
In Case 2, Condition 3 holds by Proposition 2. This means that the x∗ that implements
agent 0’s ﬁrst best implements the whole PPF. When agent 0 moves ﬁrst, x 6= x∗, because
s h ec a n n o tr e a c hh e rﬁrst best. Then the allocation is not on the PPF.B y L e m m a 3 ,
when an allocation is not on the PPF,i ti sn o tP a r e t oe ﬃcient either.
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